Water has always been an important resource for Central Asian states and peoples. Different rulers at different times used water, and access to it, as an instrument of political and even military influence. When the Russian Empire expanded into Central Asia, seizing substantial parts of three central Asian khanates (Bukhara, Khiva and Khoqand) and established its own protectorate over these states, its also found that water was one of the most effective means to control the rulers and peoples of Central Asia. The use of water and irrigation policy as an instrument of rule was effectively used by the Russian Empire in its relations with the Central Asian khanates and this has already been the subject of investigation. This paper analyses the legal regulation of water use and the irrigation policy of the Russian Empire in Turkestan in order to influence the Bukharan Emirate and the Khivan Khanate during the epoch of the Russian protectorate (1870s-1910s). The paper demonstrates how the internal "water law" was a starting point in Russian policy towards Bukhara and Khiva, and shows that each subsequent stage was closely connected to the evolution of the "water law" in the Russian Turkestan. The sources are official documents (including legal acts) of the Russian Empire, correspondence of Russian and Central Asian statesmen, memoirs of contemporaries and the notes of Russian visitors to khanates (diplomats, engineers, etc.) who participated in the realization of Russian water policy in Bukhara and Khiva and could estimate its effectiveness.
Introduction
In the 1860-70s the Russian Empire took control of three khanates of Central Asia: in 1868 treaties of peace and friendship were signed with Khoqand and Bukhara, and in 1873 with Khiva, In 1876 the Khoqand Khanate was joined to the Russian Empire (as Fergana region of Turkestan), the Emirate of Bukhara and the Khanate of Khiva became Russian protectorates.
The Russian authorities intended to begin a process of modernization of the khanates with the aim of annexing them completely. But the international situation made them preserve the formal independence of Bukhara and Khiva. This meant the abilities of Russia to reform the political, legal and economic structure of the khanates were limited, and they remained conservative feudal states whose level of development did not allow their incorporation into the Russian political and legal space.
In these circumstances, Russia had to use indirect means to influence the Bukharan and Khivan authorities. One such means was water policy as the use of water was a vitally important question in the social and economic life of Central Asia. Russia already had experience in the development and realization of water laws for some national regions such as Crimea and Transcaucasia and it now worked on creating the same legal base for Russian Turkestan. As this region had belonged to Bukhara and Khiva it seemed logical to use the same legal principles for water relations with the khanates (with regard to their specific status as protectorates) as cooperation with water could impact other areas of their relations, including politics and economics.
The Russian authorities used different kinds of cooperation with the Bukharan Emirate and the Khivan Khanate with regard to water, nevertheless, with time there were substantial changes in the relations between Russia and Bukhara and Khiva. In general the procedure of making international agreements was fixed, the status of the Central Asian monarch was specified and the possibilities of cooperation between the Russian and Central Asian authorities and business circles was clarified.
The problems of the realization of Russian water policy in Bukhara and Khiva remained until the fall of the Russian Empire. The initiatives of the Russian diplomats and engineers who tried to improve the water systems of Bukhara and Khiva met with resistance from the local authorities because of their conservative views, fear of their own subjects (who could proclaim their independence if they gained enough water without the control of the central authorities) and their unwillingness to spend money for such improvements. Some scholars have studied this theme and examined water policy in detail within the context of the Russian imperial policy in the Central Asia. 2 Below we attempt to characterize the legal aspects of this policy, define its basic directions and clarify the reasons for its ineffectiveness within the framework of Russian -Central Asian relations in general. Materials by Russian contemporaries who visited the Central Asian khanates during the 1870s-1910s give valuable information in this regard.
The first stage: negotiations in the absence of water regulation
A specific feature of the "water law" of Russian Turkestan is the absence of any official written legislation in this field; until the fall of the Russian Empire in 1917 there was no basic statutory act on water regulation. As a result the customary law used in the region remained the main source of "water law" and was even officially approved by imperial legislation for Turkestan. 3 The authors the "water laws" constantly emphasized that their goal was not to replace the legal customs by "artificial" written rules, but only to systematize their principles and make them rules of general effect for Turkestan as a whole. 4
Attempts to solve the problem of the absence of formal water regulation were made more than once: authorities developed "temporary rules" for water use, a series of projects for the "water law" were proposed from time to time. 5 Each stage in the development of the "water law" had an impact upon relations between the Russian Empire and the Bukharan Emirate and the Khivan Khanate. any written rules on the water use. 6 The positions of "water officials" (aryk-aksakals and mirabs) were retained (or even restored) in the way as they acted before in the region, including in the khanates, on the basis of customary law. 7 Water use in Bukhara and Khiva was based only on negotiations. These negotiations often became a cause for the Russian authorities to demonstrate to the Bukharans and the Khivans their supremacy in the region and the dependence of the authorities of khanate. 8 Even this absence of rules for water use became an advantage for the Russian authorities in their relations with the Central Asian khanates.
The most problematical relations were between the Turkestan and Bukharan authorities as after Samarqand joined the Russian Empire in 1868 the Russians seized control of the Zeravshan River and this gave them the opportunity to regulate the quantity of water for irrigation in Bukhara. The absence of rules (even in the treaty of 1868 which de-facto fixed the vassalage of Bukhara to the Russian Empire) made the Emir and the ruling circles of Bukhara suppliants when there was a lack of water for the capital of the Emirate and the surrounding regions. As a result, in 1870 a sorrowful message was sent by Emir Muzaffar to Konstantin von Kaufman, the Governor-General of Turkestan with a supplication to solve the water problem. 9
The fears of the Bukharan elite and general population about the possibilities and intentions of the Russian authorities towards the waters of the Zeravshan river were reflected by the famous Bukharan politician and enlightener Ahmad Donish in his "History of the Mangyt Dynasty". He emotionally described the despair of Bukharans when they understood that the water had fallen into the hands of the Russians, the feebleness of the Emir in solving this problem, and the long-term negotiations with representatives of the Russian administration.
Donish himself was a member of the Bukharan embassy to the Russian capital in 1869-1870. 10 There was an illustration in the response of the Emir to the suggested use of the Amu-Daria (Oxus) River to provide the capital with water: it had not been done before and, moreover, he was apprehensive that Russia would be displeased with his attempt to get water from another source. 11 Further, the Emir was afraid that if some regions of the Emirate got enough water their 6 6 population would not be loyal to Bukhara. 12 Even the promises of the Russian authorities to compensate Bukhara for the lack of water from the Zeravshan by the construction of a canal from the Syr-Daria River were critically interpreted by Donish: he asserted that the Russians intended to begin these works only after the total conquest of the Bukharan Emirate. 13 We could doubt the information of Donish as he was a Bukharan witness and a participant of the events which resulted in the defeat of Bukhara, and the loss of its independence and, consequently, took the situation hard, perhaps exaggerating the dependence of Emirate on the Russian Empire (including water use). However, his information in many respects is confirmed by the notes of his Russian contemporary, Lev Kostenko, the Turkestan military official and a member of the diplomatic mission to Bukhara in 1870. 14 In particular he noted that Bukhara was totally dependent on Samarqand for water and had to appeal to Russia constantly with requests for the temporary closing of aryks (irrigation ditches) for Russian inhabitants in order to give water to Bukhara. He summarized that the "supply of Bukhara with grain depended on the good-will of the Russian government". 15 The head of the Russian mission, Colonel Nosovich, also wrote in his journal that the Emir "was happy with arrival of his Russian friends and that water came with them". 16 However, Bukharan diplomats, as a result of their mission to St. Petersburg, succeeded in partially solving the problem: Governor-General von Kaufman ordered General Alexander Abramov, the head of Zeravshan District, to solve the Bukharan water problem. In the winter of 1871-1872 a special commission consisting of three Russian and three Bukharan members with Abramov at the head began a discussion on the distribution of the Zeravshan water between Samarqand and Bukhara. It was difficult for the Russian representatives to understand the logic of their Bukharan partners who used categories such as "lots of water", "a little water", "an average amount", without concrete numbers. 17 Nevertheless, preliminary terms were agreed:
Samarqand authorities agreed to close half the aryks of Zeravshan from April 15 to May 15 and 12 Already Emir Nasrulla, father of Muzaffar, practiced water drainage in different regions of his country for another ones to provide the loyalty of his subjects, see: Astanova G. Yu let water go to Bukhara, and from August 15 to September 15 to close the aryks in full. 18 But when the Russian administration raised the question of the appointment of a special representative of the Emir to control the distribution of water such an official was not appointed and water was distributed spontaneously, at the discretion of the Russian authorities. 19 Donish stated that the following year the Emir had to impose a new tax, and gathered money (100 000 tenga) to bribe Russian officials for obtaining a water. 20 Russian explorers at the end of the 19 th century sent messages that there were periods when water was not given to the Bukharans and many local inhabitants died of starvation and drought. 21 19 Above-mentioned G. Dobson wrote that "the higher authorities of Bokhara are so anxious about their proper water supply that they have the permission of the Governor-General of Turkistan to send their own officials every spring to look after the dams and dykes of the river near Samarkand" (Dobson G. Russia's railway advance into Central Asia. P. 232-233). As we can see, they have permission, but author said nothing about real sending of such officials to Turlestan! 20 Akhmad Donish. Istoriya mangitskoy dinastii. P. 110. 21 could maintain their households and get water in accordance with the same customary law as in Bukhara but had guaranteed access to water under the control of the Russian administration. 25 A contradictory situation held for irrigation in relations between the Russian Empire and the Khivan Khanate which also acknowledged its dependence on Russia in 1873. Feeling the water shortage, Khivan authorities tried to attract Russian specialists in irrigation, however they opposed the realization of large-scale irrigational projects in the khanate. The point is that Khivans since the 17 th and 18 th centuries had used dams, water exports, and the drainage of canals as instruments of war with foreign enemies (Bukhara most of all) and own against their own rebel subjects (especially Turkmen tribes). 26 At first the Russian authorities did not pay enough attention to irrigation projects as they were interested in Khivan rivers (especially Amu-Daria) as trade routes for their ships. 27 The first projects connected with diverting the Amu-Daria river were aimed to develop shipping communications with the Bukharan Emirate and the Khivan Khanate. This meant that the Gandemian Treaty with Khiva and the Shaar Treaty with Bukhara (both of 1873) did not include terms for water use but the opportunity for Russians to build quays and warehouses on the banks of Amu-Daria were regulated in detail. 28 The purpose of these projectsstrengthening Russian control over the Central Asian khanateswas evident and even not concealed by Turkestan formed by order of new Governor-General of Turkestan, Nikolai Ivanov), come to a final decision: two thirds of the water would be at the disposal of Samarqand and a third at the disposal of Bukhara. 38 As we can see, even decades after the establishment of the Russian protectorate over the Central Asian khanates relations with them were still based on negotiations and agreements, although Russia could have enforced its own will and spread its own legislation over Bukhara and Khiva. Such way would be resulted in the final joining of the khanates to the empire and that seemed too expensive for the Russian authorities, who preferred to save the system of protectorates without substantial changes in the khanates. Examples of solving irrigation problems are evidence of this tendency but at the same time, as mentioned, the absence of any systematized "water law" in Turkestan allowed the Russian authorities have the most advantageous terms during negotiations.
The second stage: attempts to institutionalize water relations
The first legal act on water use in Turkestan was "Temporary rules on irrigating" of June 19, 1877, established by von Kaufman. In fact they were used only for the Tashkent province where all water was state owned. 39 It is possible that after trialling these "Rules" in one province In his "Note" written in 1895 (at the end of his stay in Bukhara) Lessar emphasized the imperfection of the Bukharan irrigation system and incompetence among mirabs. He insisted on the appointment in the Emirate of a special engineer as an official Russian representative to develop irrigation in Bukhara and control the activity of the mirabs. 46 Due to his efforts by 1893 talented specialist Christian Gelman was assigned an engineer, but even their joint efforts were insufficient to realize any project in the Emirate. However, Lessar himself advised Gelman not to take control of the irrigation system in the Emirate immediately as he did not have the official authority; moreover, the mirabs could insight the local inhabitants against Russian officials. problem, earn the trust of the locals and only after that could he take control of irrigation in Emirate in general. 47 But in 1895 Lessar was appointed Russian representative in London, and his successor Vladimir Ignat'ev was a creature of the Russian Foreign Office rather than of Turkestan administration. So, the status of Gelman became very uncertain, first of all his expensesit was presumed that the Emir took these expenses upon himself as the engineer would work in his interests. But soon the Turkestan authorities, who desired to see in Gelman a protector of their policy in the Emirate, proposed to posting him to the staff of the regional administration with an appropriate salary. In this case he would become a representative of the Military Ministry and this was unacceptable for the Foreign Office. After consultations between the two Ministries, Gelman was recognized a military official but his responsibilities were so insignificant that he was no more than irrigation mediator between the Turkestan authorities and the Russian Political Agency in Bukhara. 48 As a result, Gelman in spite of his talents and knowledge did not succeed in solving the irrigation problems in the Emirate before he left his position in Bukhara in 1900. For example, in 1896 he developed a project of to drain an aryk in Bukhara which was the cause of many diseases among inhabitants, 49 estimated the cost (120 000 rubles) and sent it to Turkestan authorities. The Construction department of the Governor-General's administration approved the project (naturally at the expense of the Emir), but the project was delayed. In 1898 the Governor-General Alexander Vrevskiy was replaced by Sergey Dukhovskoy, and the Emir used this replacement to reject the project because of its cost: he promised to drain the aryk on his own without Russian specialists. Gubarevich-Radobylskiy who described this episode, wrote in 1905 that the problem still had not been solved. The Khan explained this by the desire to retain the existing irrigation constructions, but, in truth, he still did not want to increase the water-supply for mutinous Turkmen tribes, 52 and in that he succeeded. Gelman who visited Khiva to inspect the Lauzan Canal, noticed that it was meandering and, consequently, did not have the depth to provide Turkmen regions with enough water. 53 But most of these projects were utopian as their authors, as a rule, were not familiar with the geography of Central Asia, the conditions of its rivers or the irrigation systems. Only at the end of the 19 th century did businessmen begin to suggest projects including irrigation and watersupply taking into account specific regional features and the level of development of the states and regions. One of the first such projects was developed by Samarqand merchant Ya. A.
The third stage: disputes on the water law and coming of the private capital
Rechtzammer in 1896: he tried to organize "The Society of Amu-Daria Canal" 300 vestas long to Kelif and Karshi irrigating the adjacent lands. The cost of the project was determined at 5-6 million rubles, 54 and Rechtzammer did not intend to ask for subsidies from the Russian or Bukharan treasury. The only condition was the granting of all irrigated lands to the management of the "Society" with the right to rent them; in its turn, the "Society" committed to provide Old and New Bukhara with water for free. The project was sent to the Russian political agent Ignat'ev who rejected it under pretext that Emir did not want to entrust irrigation policy to private entrepreneurs. 55 To our mind the real reason was the absence of developed legislation on the participation of private organizations and persons in the irrigation policy in Turkestan itself. Lykoshin, head of the Amu-Daria military section: he stated that the contract contradicted the terms of Gandemian Treaty of 1873 (Lykoshin treated such terms very freely), and that Isfendiar Khan did not have the rights to sell the lands of Amu-Daria in mulk (private ownership). 59 This meant the representative of the Russian administration refused to approve a deal of a Russian subject with the Khivan khan using categories of Islamic law. But, in fact, the Russian authorities found that Prince Andronikov intended to buy land included in the plan of the irrigation works of Russian administration and suspected him of speculation. 60 The example of Andronikov is the most well known and, possibly the most glaring, but it is not the only one. In 1912 Captain Anan'ev, a military engineer, also registered a concession and was released of taxation payments for the time when he was to carry out irrigation works 
